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FOREWORD 
This paper i s  an ed i ted  version of an e a r l i e r  paper e n t i t l e d  
"Spacecraft R e l i a b i l i t y  and Qualification" which was presented a t  t he  
Gemini Mid-Program Conference a t  NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, 
Texas on February 23 t o  25, 1966. 
were : 
The authors of t h e  o r i g i n a l  paper 
W .  Harry Douglas, formerly Deputy Manager, Office of Test Opera- 
t i o n s ,  Gemini Program Office,  NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, and now 
Manager, Test Operations Office for  t h e  Apollo Applications Program 
Office, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center. 
Gregory P. McIntosh, Gemini Program Office, NASA Manned Spacecraft 
Center. 
Lemuel S. Menear, Gemini Program Advisor, F l igh t  Safety Office, 
NASA Manned Spacecraft Center. 
This paper d i f f e r s  from the o r ig ina l  presentation i n  t h a t  t h e  
emphasis has been placed on t h e  guidance and control  system of the  
Gemini spacecraft .  
This paper i s  t o  be presented before the  NATO Advisory Group fo r  
Aeronautical Research and Development, Guidance and Control Panel 
Symposium, P a r i s ,  France on March 7 and 8, 1967. 
GEMINI RELLABILITY AND QUALIFICATION EXPERIENCE 
W. Harry Douglas* 
NASA Manned Spacecraft Center 
1. SUMMARY 
The Gemini r e l i a b i l i t y  and qua l i f ica t ion  program was based on con- 
vent ional  concepts. However, these concepts were modified with unique 
fea tures  t o  obtain the  r e l i a b i l i t y  required f o r  manned space f l i g h t  and 
t o  optimize the  r e l i a b i l i t y  and qua l i f ica t ion  e f f o r t .  
Ehphasis was placed on establ ishing high inherent r e l i a b i l i t y  and 
l o w  crew-hazard cha rac t e r i s t i c s  ear ly  i n  the  design phases of t h e  Gemini 
Program. Concurrently, an integrated ground t e s t  program was formulated 
and implemented by the  prime contractor  and the  major suppl ie rs  of f l i g h t  
hardware. All data  derived from a l l  t e s t s  were cor re la ted  and used t o  
confirm the  r e l i a b i l i t y  a t ta ined .  
Mission-success and crew-safety design goals were establ ished con- 
t r a c t u a l l y ,  and estimates were made f o r  each of the  Gemini missions 
without conducting c l a s s i c a l  r e l i a b i l i t y  mean-time-to-failure t e s t i n g .  
Design reviews were conducted by r e l i a b i l i t y  engineers s k i l l e d  i n  
t h e  use of r e l i a b i l i t y  analysis  techniques. 
independently of the  designers t o  insure  unbiased evaluations of t h e  
The reviews were conducted 
*Other contr ibutors  t o  t h i s  paper were Gregory P. McIntosh and 
Lemuel S. Menear, NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, Houston, Texas. 
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design for  r e l i a b i l i t y  and crew safe ty  and were completed p r i o r  t o  spec- 
i f i c a t i o n  approval and the  re lease  of production drawings. 
An ambitious system t o  cont ro l  qua l i ty  was r i g i d l y  enforced t o  at- 
t a i n  and maintain the r e l i a b i l i t y  inherent i n  the  spacecraf t  design. 
A closed-loop fa i lure- repor t ing  and correct ive-act ion system was 
adopted which required the  analysis ,  determination of t he  cause, and cor- 
rec t ive  action f o r  a l l  f a i l u r e s ,  malfunctions, or anomalies. 
The integrated ground t e s t  program consis ted of development, qual- 
i f i c a t i o n ,  and r e l i a b i l i t y  t e s t s  and was conducted under r i g i d  qua l i ty -  
control  survei l lance.  This t e s t  program, coupled with two unmanned 
Gemini f l i g h t s ,  qua l i f ied  the  spacecraft  f o r  manned f l i g h t s .  
2. INTRODUCTION 
Approximately 6 years  ago, men ventured b r i e f l y  i n t o  space and r e -  
turned safely.  These i n i t i a l  manned space f l i g h t s  were, indeed, t r e -  
mendous achievements which s t i r r e d  the  imagination of people worldwide. 
They a l so  served t o  provide a focus f o r  t he  d i r ec t ion  of fu ture  e f f o r t s .  
Gemini was the  f i r s t  United S ta t e s  manned space f l i g h t  program t h a t  had 
the  opportunity t o  take t h i s  e a r l y  experience and ca r ry  out a develop- 
ment, t e s t ,  and f l i g h t  program i n  an attempt t o  r e f l e c t  t he  lessons 
learned. 
The l eve l  of r e l i a b i l i t y  and crew safe ty ,  a t t a ined  i n  the  Gemini 
spacecraf t  and demonstrated during the  12  Gemini missions,  i s  the  
r e s u l t  of a concerted e f f o r t  by contractor  and customer engineers,  
technicians,  and management personnel working together as  one team 
within a management s t ruc ture  which permitted an unres t r ic ted  exchange 
of information and promoted a rapid decision-making process. 
Stringent numerical design goals f o r  Gemini mission success and 
crew safe ty  were placed on t h e  spacecraft  contractor  who incorporated 
these goals i n  each spec i f ica t ion  wr i t ten  f o r  f l i g h t  hardware. 
t h i s  spec i f ica t ion  requirement, the suppl iers  had t o  give prime con- 
s idera t ion  t o  the  select ion,  integrat ion,  and packaging of component 
p a r t s  i n t o  a r e l i a b l e  end item. 
from the  major equipment suppliers t o  assess  t h e  design f o r  the inherent 
capabi l i ty  of meeting the establ ished design goal.  
To meet 
R e l i a b i l i t y  analyses were required 
- 
The spacecraft  contractor was required t o  in tegra te  the  I 
I i n  t he  spacecraft  t o  meet t h e  overa l l  r e l i a b i l i t y  goal. 
' subcontractor-supplied hardware and t o  e f fec t  t h e  necessary redundancy 
I I 
Examples of t h e  spacecraft  redundant fea tures  were: 
(1) Duplicate horizon sensors were incorporated i n  t h e  guidance 
system. 
( 2 )  hrery function i n  the  pyrotechnic system incorporated a re- 
dundant feature .  
( 3) Two completely independent reentry-control propulsion systems 
were i n s t a l l e d  i n  the  spacecraft .  
(4) Redundant coolant sulpystems were incorporated i n  t h e  environ- 
mental control  system. 
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( 5 )  Six fue l - ce l l  s tacks were incorporated i n  the  e l e c t r i c a l  sys- 
tem although only three  a re  required fo r  any long-duration mission. 
Redundant systems or backup procedures were provided where a s ing le  
f a i l u r e  could be catastrophic  t o  the  crew or the  spacecraf t .  
Concurrent with design and developments, an in tegra ted  ground t e s t  
program was establ ished.  
t o  form a bas i s  f o r  declar ing the  Gemini spacecraft  qua l i f ied  f o r  the  
various phases of t he  f l i g h t  tes t  program. 
ground t e s t  program can bes t  be appreciated by viewing f igu re  1, which 
shows t h e  density of t h e  t e s t  e f f o r t  w i t h  respect  t o  the  production of 
the  f l i g h t  equipment. The high l e v e l  of ground t e s t  e f f o r t  commenced 
a t  t he  outset  of  t he  program and was sustained past  t he  f i r s t  severa l  
f l i g h t s .  The a b i l i t y  t o  f l y  w i t h  some qua l i f i ca t ion  t e s t i n g  underway 
i s  r e l a t e d  t o  the differences between the  e a r l y  spacecraf t  configurat ions 
and the  long-duration and rendezvous spacecraf t  configurations.  It was 
hoped t h a t  the ground t e s t i n g  could be completed e a r l i e r ,  but  the prob- 
lems t h a t  were i so l a t ed  and the  required cor rec t ive  ac t ion  prevented 
e a r l i e r  accomplishment. I n  s p i t e  of t he  g rea t  e f f o r t  involved, it was 
b e t t e r  t o  u t i l i z e  a ground t e s t  program t o  f e r r e t  out problems than t o  
encounter them i n  f l i g h t .  
Data from a l l  t e s t s  were co l lec ted  and analyzed 
The value of t he  in tegra ted  
Development t e s t s  were i n i t i a l l y  performed t o  prove t h e  design con- 
cepts .  
r a t ion  design and manufacturing techniques. 
beyond the  spec i f ica t ion  requirements t o  e s t a b l i s h  reasonable design 
Qual i f ica t ion  tes ts  were conducted t o  prove t h e  f l i g h t  configu- 
Tests  were then extended 
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margins of sa fe ty .  
t he  v a l i d i t y  of design assumptions and t o  develop confidence i n  space- 
c r a f t  systems and launch-vehicle in te r faces  p r i o r  t o  manned f l i g h t s .  
The unmanned f l i g h t  tes ts  were conducted t o  confirm 
Specif ic  test-program reviews were held a t  t he  prime con t r ac to r ' s  
p l an t  and a t  each major subcontractor 's  f a c i l i t y  t o  preclude dupl icat ion 
of t e s t i n g  and t o  insure t h a t  every pa r t i c ipan t  i n  the Gemini Program 
was following t h e  same bas ic  guidelines.  
3. MISSION SUCCESS AND CREW SAFETY 
A numerical design goal  was establ ished t o  represent  t he  p robab i l i t y  
of the spacecraft  performing s a t i s f a c t o r i l y  f o r  t h e  accomplishment of 
a l l  primary mission object ives .  The a r b i t r a r y  value of 0.95, which 
recognizes a r i s k  of f a i l i n g  t o  meet 1 primary object ive out of 20 on 
each mission, was selected.  The 0.95 mission-success design goal  was 
included i n  the  prime contract  as  a design goal  r a the r  than a firm r e -  
quirement, which would have required demonstration by mean-time-to- 
f a i l u r e  t e s t i n g .  
f o r  each of t he  spacecraft  systems and incorporated the  apportioned 
The prime contractor calculated numerical apportionments 
values i n  major system and subsystem contractor  requirements. Re l i ab i l -  
i t y  est imates ,  derived primarily from component f a i lu re - r a t e  da ta  and 
made during the design phase, indicated t h a t  t h e  design would support 
the es tab l i shed  design-mission success goal.  
by major spacecraf t  system, f o r  the Gemini I11 spacecraf t ,  are  shown 
The r e l i a b i l i t y  es t imates ,  
i n  t a b l e  I. 
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Crew safety design goals were a l s o  establ ished,  but  f o r  the  much 
higher value of 0,995 f o r  a l l  missions. 
having the f l i g h t  crew safe ly  survive a l l  missions or a l l  mission a t -  
tempts . 
C r e w  safety was defined as 
Planned mission success, gross mission success, and crew safety 
estimates were a l so  made p r i o r  t o  each manned mission, using the  f l i g h t  
data and data generated by the  integrated ground t e s t  program; each 
estimate ref lected assurance of conducting the  mission successfully 
and safely.  
A detai led f a i l u r e  mode and e f f e c t  analysis  was conducted on the  
complete spacecraft by t h e  prime contractor ,  and on each subsystem by 
the cognizant subcontractor, t o  inves t iga te  each f a i l u r e  mode and assess  
i t s  e f f e c t  on mission success and crew safe ty .  The analysis  included an 
evaluation of :  
(1) Mode of f a i l u r e  
( 2 )  
(3) 
(4)  Indications of f a i l u r e  
(5)  
(6) Probabili ty of occurrence 
Corrective act ion was taken when it was determined t h a t  t h e  f a i l u r e  
Fai lure  e f fec t  on system operation 
Failure e f f e c t  on the  mission 
Crew and ground act ion as a r e s u l t  of the f a i l u r e  
mode would grossly a f f e c t  mission success o r  jeopardize t h e  safe ty  of 
the  crew. 
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. 
A single-point f a i l u r e  mode and e f f e c t  ana lys i s  was conducted f o r  
a l l  manned missions t o  i s o l a t e  s ingle  f a i l u r e s  which could prevent re- 
covery of t he  spacecraf t  or a safe  recovery of t h e  crew. The s ingle-  
point  f a i l u r e  modes were evaluated, and act ions were taken t o  eliminate 
the single-point f a i l u r e  or justif 'y the  design adequacy, and t o  pre- 
sc r ibe  t h e  necessary precautions t o  minimize t h e  probabi l i ty  of occur- 
rence. 
4. DESIGN REVIEWS 
C r i t i c a l  r e l i a b i l i t y  design reviews were conducted as  soon as  t h e  
in te r im design was establ ished.  The reviews were conducted by r e l i a b i l -  
i t y  personnel, independent of t he  designer,  and r e su l t ed  i n  recommended 
changes t o  improve the  r e l i a b i l i t y  of a l l  the respect ive systems or 
subsystems. The reviews included t h e  use of :  
(1) Numerical analyses 
(2)  Stress analyses 
(3) Analyses of f a i l u r e  modes 
(4) 
A t y p i c a l  design change i s  shown schematically i n  f igu re  2. 
Trade-off s tud ies  t o  evaluate the  need fo r  redundant fea tures  
This 
change was incorporated because the  2-day Gemini rendezvous f l i g h t  re- 
quired four  of t h e  s i x  fue l - ce l l  s tacks,  th ree  s tacks t o  a sect ion,  t o  
meet mission object ives .  The f a i l u r e  of a s ing le  supply pressure regula- 
t o r  would have caused the loss  of a fue l - ce l l  sect ion.  Therefore, it was 
necessary t h a t  each of t he  two regulators  which cont ro l  t h e  reac tan t  
a 
supply be capable of supplying r eac t an t s  t o  both fue l - ce l l  sec t ions .  
The crossover provided t h i s  capabi l i ty .  
power system r e l i a b i l i t y  s l i g h t l y  increased f o r  t h e  2-week mission. 
r e l i a b i l i t y  was increased from 0.988 t o  0.993 fo r  an assumed f a i l u r e  
r a t e  of lom4 f a i l u r e s  per hour. 
increased for  the  2-day mission. 
Figure 3 shows the  e l e c t r i c a l  
The 
Figure 4 shows the  r e l i a b i l i t y  g r e a t l y  
It cannot be overemphasized t h a t  r e l i a b i l i t y  i s  an inherent charac- 
t e r i s t i c  and must be rea l ized  as  a r e s u l t  of design and development. 
Inherent r e l i a b i l i t y  cannot be inspected or  t e s t e d  i n t o  an item during 
production. A t  b e s t ,  t h a t  which i s  inherent  can only be a t ta ined  o r  
maintained through r i g i d  qua l i t y  control .  
views and the  numerical analyses were conducted as  ea r ly  as  November 1962, 
pr io r  t o  the fabr ica t ion  of t he  f irst  production prototypes.  
These r e l i a b i l i t y  design r e -  
5. DEVELOPMENT TESTS 
Development t e s t s  using engineering models were conducted t o  es tab-  
l i s h  the  f e a s i b i l i t y  of design concepts. 
designs and demonstrated funct ional  performance and s t r u c t u r a l  i n t e g r i t y  
p r io r  t o  committing production hardware t o  formal qua l i f i ca t ion  t e s t s .  
These t e s t s  explored various 
I n  some cases,  environmental t e s t s  were conducted on these u n i t s  t o  
obtain information p r i o r  t o  t h e  formal qua l i f i ca t ion .  
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6. INTEGRATED SYSTEM TESTS 
In tegra ted  system tes ts  were conducted during progressive s tages  of 
t h e  development t o  demonstrate the compatibi l i ty  of system in t e r f aces .  
Such systems as  the  i n e r t i a l  guidance system, the  propulsion system, 
and the  environmental cont ro l  system were espec ia l ly  subjected t o  such 
t e s t s .  Early prototype modules were used i n  s t a t i c  a r t i c l e s  or mockups, 
which represented complete o r  p a r t i a l  vehicles .  They served t o  acquaint 
operating personnel with the  equipment and t o  i s o l a t e  problems involving 
e l ec t r i ca l - e l ec t ron ic  in t e r f ace ,  radiofrequency in te r fe rence ,  and 
system-design compatibil i ty.  
When production prototype systems became avai lable  , a complete 
spacecraf t  compat ibi l i ty  t e s t  un i t  was assembled a t  t h e  prime contrac- 
t o r ' s  f a c i l i t y  ( f i g .  5 ) .  During these t e s t s ,  system in tegra t ion  was 
accomplished by end-to-end t e s t  methods. 
reso lu t ion  of problems involving mechanical i n t e r f ace ,  e l e c t r i c a l -  
e l ec t ron ic  in te r fe rence ,  radiofrequency in te r fe rence ,  spacecraf t  com- 
p a t i b i l i t y ,  f i n a l  t es t  procedures compatibi l i ty ,  and compatibi l i ty  with 
aerospace ground equipment (AGE), p r i o r  t o  assembly and checkout of t he  
first f l i g h t  vehicle .  
These tes t s  permitted the  
One of t h e  more s ign i f i can t  in tegra ted  system t e s t s  was t h e  thermal 
qua l i f i ca t ion  o r  t he  spacecraf t  thermal-balance tes t .  This t e s t  was 
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conducted on a complete production spacecraf t .  
a cold-wall a l t i t u d e  chamber t h a t  simulated a l t i t u d e  and o r b i t a l  heat-  
ing cha rac t e r i s t i c s  with the  spacecraf t  powered. 
Tests were conducted i n  
The t e s t  r e s u l t s  demonstrated the  need f o r  heating devices on the  
propulsion system and on water l i n e s  t o  prevent f reezing conditions 
during the  long duration mission. 
7. SYSTEM QUALIFICATION TEST I 
Because f ly ing  all-up manned space vehicles  i s  expensive, time 
consuming, and exceedingly c r i t i c a l  t o  f a i l u r e s ,  t he  Gemini development 
was based on the  premise t h a t  confidence could be achieved through a 
properly configured program of ground tes ts  and t h a t  a very l imi ted  
number of unmanned f l i g h t s  could serve t o  va l ida t e  the  approach. 
Each item of spacecraft  equipment was qua l i f i ed  p r i o r  t o  t he  m i s -  
s ion on which the  item was t o  be flown. 
qua l i f ied  when su f f i c i en t  t e s t s  had been successful ly  conducted t o  
demonstrate t h a t  a production u n i t ,  produced by production personnel and 
w i t h  production tool ing,  complied with t h e  design requirements. 
t e s t s  included a t  l e a s t  one simulation of a long-duration f l i g h t ,  o r  one 
rendezvous mission, o r  both,  i f  necessary, with the  system operating t o  
i t s  expected duty cycle.  
The equipment was considered 
These 
Qual i f ica t ion  requirements were es tab l i shed  and incorporated i n  a l l  
spacecraf t  equipment spec i f ica t ions .  The spec i f i ca t ions  imposed var ied 
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requirements on equipment, depending on the  loca t ion  of t he  equipment i n  
the  spacecraf t ,  t he  function t o  be performed by the  equipment, and t h e  
packaging of the  equipment. 
The environmental l eve l s  t o  which the  equipment was subjected were 
based on an t ic ipa ted  p re f l igh t ,  f l i g h t ,  and p o s t f l i g h t  condi t ions.  How- 
ever, the  environmental l eve l s  were revised whenever ac tua l  t e s t  o r  
f l i g h t  experience revealed t h a t  the o r i g i n a l  an t ic ipa ted  l e v e l s  were 
u n r e a l i s t i c .  This i s  exemplified by: 
(1) The an t ic ipa ted  launch v ibra t ion  requirement f o r  t he  spacecraf t  
was based on da ta  accumulated on Mercury-Atlas f l i g h t s .  The upper-two 
,sigma l i m i t  of these data required a power spec t r a l  densi ty  p r o f i l e  of 
approximately 12g random vibrat ion.  
Gemini I f l i g h t  demonstrated t h a t  t he  ac tua l  f l i g h t  l eve l s  were l e s s  than 
This l e v e l  was revised because the  
expected. The new da ta  permitted the  power spec t r a l  dens i ty  t o  be 
changed, and by using the  upper-three sigma l i m i t  the  requirement was 
reduced t o  an ove ra l l  rms accelerat ion l e v e l  of 7g random i n  the  space- 
c r a f t  adapter and t o  8.8g random i n  the  reent ry  module. 
( 2 )  An aneroid device used i n  the  personnel parachute was expected 
t o  experience a r e l a t i v e l y  severe humidity; therefore ,  the  qua l i f i ca t ion  
t e s t  p lan  required the  aneroid device t o  pass a 10-day 95-percent r e l a -  
t i v e  humidity t e s t .  The o r ig ina l  design of the  aneroid device could not 
survive t h i s  requirement and was i n  the  process of being redesigned when 
t h e  Gemini I V  mission revealed t h a t  t he  ac tua l  humidity i n  the  space- 
c r a f t  cabin was considerably lower than expected. The requirement was 
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reduced t o  an 85-percent r e l a t i v e  humidity, and the  new aneroid device 
successf i l ly  completed qua l i f ica t ion .  
The tank bladders of the propulsion system did not pass t h e  ( 3 )  
o r i g i n a l  qua l i f ica t ion  slosh tests.  Analyses of t h e  f a i l u r e s  concluded 
t h a t  t h e  slosh t e s t s  conducted a t  one g were overly severe r e l a t i v e  t o  
ac tua l  s lo sh  conditions i n  a zero-g environment. The slosh tes t  w a s  
changed t o  simulate zero-g conditions more accurately,  and t h e  slosh 
r a t e  w a s  reduced t o  a r e a l i s t i c  value. The tes ts  then w e r e  repeated 
successfully under the  revised t e s t  conditions. 
The development and timely execution of a r e a l i s t i c  qua l i f ica t ion  
program can be a t t r i b u t e d ,  i n  p a r t ,  t o  a vigorous e f f o r t  by government 
and contractor personnel conducting test-program reviews a t  the major 
subcontractor p lan ts  during the  i n i t i a l  qua l i f ica t ion  phase of the  
program. The objective of the  reviews was t o  a l i n e  the  respect ive sys- 
tem t e s t  program t o  conform t o  an in tegra ted  t e s t  philosophy. 
i n a l  t e s t  reviews were followed with periodic s t a t u s  reviews t o  assure 
t h a t  the t e s t  programs were modified t o  r e f l e c t  the  l a t e s t  program r e -  
quirements and t o  assure the  t imely completion of a l l  t e s t i n g  which 
represented cons t ra in ts  f o r  the various missions. 
The or ig-  
Figure 6 i s  a block diagram of the  Gemini guidance and control  sys- 
The qua l i f ica t ion  t e s t  environments required for t h e  d i g i t a l  com- tem. 
mand system are  shown i n  t a b l e  11. These data  were ex t rac ted  from the  , 
Spacecraft qua l i f ica t ion  s t a t u s  repor t ,  and show t h e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  Status .  
Although the d i g i t a l  command system did not experience a l l  the  
, 
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environments shown here, the data provide a typical example of the 
Gemini guidance and control component qualification test requirements. 
All environmental requirements were not applicable since the digital 
command system was located in the adapter and did not experience such 
environments as oxygen atmosphere and salt-water immersion. Those 
environments which were required are noted with a C o r  S in the appro- 
priate column. The C designates that the equipment has successfully 
completed the test, and the S designates that the equipment has been 
qualified by similarity. A component or assembly is considered quali- 
fied by similarity when it can be determined by a detailed engineering 
analysis that design changes have not adversely affected the qualifica- 
tion of the item. 
8. RELIABILITY TESTING 
For programs such as Gemini, which involve small production quan- 
tities, the inherent reliability must be established early in the design 
phase and realized through a strict quality control system. 
feasible to conduct classical reliability tests to demonstrate equip- 
ment reliability to a significant statistical level of confidence. 
sequently, no mean-time-to-failure testing was conducted. 
Gemini hardware was established by analyzing the results of all test data 
derived from the integrated ground and flight test program, and by con- 
ducting additional reliability tests on selected components and systems 
whose functions were considered critical to successful mission accom- 
pli shment . 
It was not 
Con- 
Confidence in 
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Equipent  was selected for  r e l i a b i l i t y  t es t s  a f t e r  evaluating the 
more probable f a i l u r e  modes. 
design margins o r  t o  reveal  marginal design c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  and they 
included exposure t o  environmental extremes such as: 
The t e s t s  were designed t o  confirm the  
(1) 
(2) 
Temperature and vibrat ion beyond the design envelope 
Applied voltage or pressure beyond the normal mission condi- 
t i o n  
(3) 
(4)  
The r e l i a b i l i t y  t e s t s  conducted on the  d i g i t a l  command system are  
shown i n  tab le  111. These t e s t s  overstressed t h e  d i g i t a l  command sys- 
tem i n  acceleration, vibrat ion,  voltage,  and combinations of a l t i t u d e ,  
temperature, voltage,  and time. These overstress  t es t s  confirmed an 
adequate design margin inherent i n  the  d i g i t a l  command system. 
Combined environments t o  produce more severe equipment s t r e s s  
Endurance beyond the  normal mission duty cycles 
Typical r e l i a b i l i t y  t e s t s  on other systems and components included 
such environments as  proof-pressure cycling, repeated simulated missions, 
and system operation w i t h  induced contamination. The contamination t e s t  
was conducted on the  reentry control  system and t h e  o r b i t a l  a t t i t u d e  and 
maneuver system because these systems were designed with f i l t e r s  and 
pressure regulators which contained small o r i f i c e s  suscept ible  t o  clog- 
ging. 
Some r e l i a b i l i t y  t e s t s  were eliminated when Gemini f l i g h t  data  r e -  
vealed t h a t  i n  some instances q u a l i f i c a t i o n  tes t s  had a c t u a l l y  been over- 
s t r e s s  t e s t s .  This was p a r t i c u l a r l y  t r u e  w i t h  respect  t o  v ibra t ion .  
A l l  f a i l u r e s  which occurred during t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  t e s t s  were ana- 
lyzed t o  determine the  cause of f a i l u r e  and t o  e s t ab l i sh  the required 
cor rec t ive  act ion.  Decisions t o  redesign, r e t e s t ,  o r  change processes 
i n  manufacturing were rendered a f t e r  ca re fu l  consideration of the prob- 
a b i l i t y  of occurrence, mission performance impact, schedule, and cos t .  
For the  most p a r t ,  t he  r e l i a b i l i t y  t e s t s  were conducted as  a con- 
t i nua t ion  of t he  formal qua l i f ica t ion  t e s t s  on the same t e s t  specimens 
used i n  t h e  qua l i f i ca t ion  t e s t s  after appropriate ref’urbishment and 
acceptance t e s t i n g .  When the  previous t e s t i n g  expended the  t e s t  specimen 
t o  a s t a t e  t h a t  precluded refurbishment, addi t iona l  new tes t  u n i t s  were 
used. 
9. QUALITY CONTROL 
A r i g i d  qua l i t y  cont ro l  system was developed and implemented t o  a t -  
t a i n  and maintain the  r e l i a b i l i t y  t h a t  was inherent  i n  the  spacecraft  
design. This system required f l i g h t  equipment t o  be produced as near ly  
. as  possible  t o  the qua l i f ied  configuration. 
The unique fea tures  of t he  qual i ty  cont ro l  system which contributed 
t o  t h e  success of t he  Gemini f l i g h t  program were: 
(1) Configuration cont ro l  
(2)  Mater ia l  cont ro l  
(3) Quality workmanship 
(4) Rigid inspect ion 
(5)  Spacecraft acceptance c r i t e r i a  
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Configuration cont ro l  i s  necessary t o  maintain spacecraf t  qua l i ty ;  
therefore ,  contractor  and customer management developed and implemented 
a r i g i d  and rap id  change-control system which permitted required changes 
t o  be documented, approved, implemented, and v e r i f i e d  by qua l i t y  cont ro l ,  
w i t h  t he  inspector being f u l l y  cognizant of t he  change before it was 
implemented on the  spacecraf t .  
and the  program impact had been evaluated f o r  design value, schedule, 
and cos t ,  the proposed change was formally presented t o  the  management 
change board f o r  approval and implementation. All changes made t o  t h e  
spacecraft  were processed through the  change board. 
When a change was considered necessary,  
Each a r t i c l e  of f l i g h t  equipment was i d e n t i f i e d  by a p a r t  number. 
Components, such as  re lay  panels,  tank assemblies, and higher orders of 
e l e c t r i c a l  o r  e lec t ronic  assemblies, were se r i a l i zed ,  and each s e r i a l i z e d  
component was accounted and recorded i n  the  spacecraf t  inventory a t  t he  
time it was i n s t a l l e d  i n  the  spacecraf t .  
Exotic mater ia l s  such a s  t i tanium, Rene' 41, and explosive mater ia l s  
used i n  pyrotechnics were accounted f o r  by l o t s  t o  permit i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
of any suspect assembly when it was determined t h a t  a p a r t  was defec- 
t i v e  because of mater ia l  deficiency. 
Inspection personnel and f ab r i ca t ion  technicians who required a 
pa r t i cu la r  s k i l l  such as  solder ing,  welding, and brazing were t r a ined  
and c e r t i f i e d  f o r  t he  respect ive s k i l l  and retested f o r  prof ic iency a t  
regular  i n t e rva l s  t o  r e t a i n  qua l i t y  workmanship. 
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The very s t r i c t  cont ro l  of pa r t s  and fabr ica ted  assemblies was main- 
ta ined  by r i g i d  inspect ion methods. 
or tes t  anomalies were recorded and resolved regard less  of t he  s i g n i f i -  
cance that was apparent t o  t h e  inspector a t  t he  t i m e  of occurrence. 
equipment i n s t a l l a t i o n s  and removals required an inspect ion approval 
p r i o r  t o  making or breaking any system in te r faces .  
A l l  def ic ienc ies ,  discrepancies,  
A l l  
Formal spacecraf t  acceptance reviews were conducted a t  s t r a t e g i c  
The reviews were s tages  of t h e  spacecraf t  assembly and tes t  p ro f i l e .  
conducted with both the  customer and the  contractor  reviewing a l l  t e s t  
da ta  and inspection records t o  i s o l a t e  any condition which occurred 
during the  preceding manufacturing and test  a c t i v i t y  t h a t  could adversely 
a f f e c t  t he  performance of t he  equipment. 
All f a i l u r e s ,  malfinctions, o r  out-of-tolerance conditions t h a t  
had not been resolved were brought t o  the  a t t en t ion  of t he  management 
review board fo r  reso lu t ion  and correct ive measures. 
conducted p r i o r  t o  f i n a l  spacecraft  system t e s t s  a t  t h e  cont rac tor ' s  
p l an t  immediately p r i o r  t o  spacecraft  del ivery,  and approximately 
10 days preceding the  impending f l i g h t .  
The reviews were 
10. FLIGHT EQUIPMENT TESTS 
A s e r i e s  of t e s t s  were conducted on a l l  f l i g h t  a r t i c l e s  t o  provide 
assurance t h a t  t h e  r e l i a b i l i t y  po ten t i a l  of t h e  design had not been 
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* degraded i n  the  fabr ica t ion  and handling 
conducted on f l i g h t  equipment included: 
of the hardware. The t e s t s  
Receiving inspect ion 
In- l ine  production t e s t s  
Predelivery acceptance tes ts  (PDA) 
P re ins t a l l a t ion  acceptance t e s t s  (PIA) 
Combined spacecraft  system t e s t  (SST) 
Spacecraft-launch vehicle j o i n t  combined system t e s t s  
Countdown 
I n  receiving inspect ion,  c r i t i c a l  p a r t s  were given a 100-percent 
inspection t h a t  could have included X-ray, chemical ana lys i s ,  spectro-  
graphs, and funct ional  t e s t s .  
While t h e  equipment was being assembled, addi t iona l  t e s t s  were per- 
Mandatory inspec- formed t o  de tec t  def ic ienc ies  ea r ly  i n  manufacturing. 
t i o n  points were es tab l i shed  a t  s t r a t e g i c  i n t e r v a l s  during the  produc- 
t i o n  process. 
for  potted modules and pr ior- to-closure f o r  hermetically-sealed packages. 
A s  an example, c e r t a i n  e lec t ronic  modules of t h e  onboard computer r e -  
ceived as  many as  11 f'unctional t e s t s  before they went i n t o  the  f i n a l  
acceptance t e s t .  
These were es tab l i shed  a t  such poin ts  a s  pr ior- to-pot t ing 
A predelivery acceptance t e s t  v e r i f i e d  t h e  func t iona l  performance 
of t he  equipment and was performed a t  t h e  vendor's p l a n t  i n  the  presence 
of vendor and government qua l i t y  cont ro l  representa t ives .  
fo r  t he  i n e r t i a l  measuring u n i t  included environmental exposure t o  
These t e s t s  
A 
vibra t ion  and temperature because these environments were considered t o  
be prime cont r ibu tors  t o  the  mechanics of f a i l u r e .  
c r i t i c a l  equipment, spacecraf t  contractor  engineering and qua l i ty  con- 
t r o l  and government engineering representat ives  were a l so  present  t o  
witness t h e  t e s t  f o r  i n i t i a l  de l iver ies .  
For complex o r  
Pr ior  t o  i n s t a l l a t i o n  i n  t h e  spacecraf t ,  the u n i t  was given a pre- 
i n s t a l l a t i o n  acceptance t e s t  t o  ve r i fy  t h a t  the funct ional  cha rac t e r i s t i c s  
o r  ca l ib ra t ion  had not changed during shipment. This test  was conducted 
i d e n t i c a l l y  t o  the predel ivery acceptance tes t  where f eas ib l e ,  except 
when a difference i n  t e s t  equipnent necessi ta ted a change. When d i f -  
ferences i n  t e s t  equipment d ic ta ted  a difference i n  the  t e s t i n g  procedure, 
the t e s t  media (such as  f lu ids ,  applied voltages,  and pressures)  were 
i d e n t i c a l ,  and t e s t  da ta  were recorded i n  the  same u n i t s  of measure i n  
order t o  compare t e s t  results with previous tes t  dsta .  This permitted 
a rap id  de tec t ion  of the s l i g h t e s t  change i n  the  performance of t he  
e qui pment . 
Spacecraft systems t e s t s  were performed on the  systems a f t e r  i n s t a l -  
l a t i o n  i n  the  spacecraf t ,  p r i o r  t o  del ivery.  They included individual  
systems tes ts  p r i o r  t o  mating the spacecraf t  sect ions,  in tegra ted  sys- 
tems t e s t s ,  simulated f l i g h t  t e s t s ,  and a l t i t u d e  chamber t e s t s  a f t e r  
mating a l l  of  the spacecraft  sections.  These t e s t s  used spec ia l  con- 
nec tors  b u i l t  i n t o  t h e  equipment t o  prevent equipment disconnection which 
would inva l ida te  system in te r faces .  
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Similar systems t e s t s  were repeated during spacecraft  premate 
ve r i f i ca t ion  a t  the  launch-site checkout f a c i l i t y .  After the  space- 
c r a f t  had been e l e c t r i c a l l y  connected t o  the launch vehicle ,  a s e r i e s  
of integrated system funct ional  t e s t s  were performed. 
of these  t e s t s ,  simulated f l i g h t s  which exercise  the  abort  mode sequences 
were conducted i n  combination with the  launch vehicle ,  t he  Mission 
Control Center, the  Manned Space F l igh t  Network, and t h e  f l i g h t  crew. 
Upon completion 
The countdown was the  l a s t  i n  a s e r i e s  of systems funct ional  t e s t s  
t o  ve r i fy  t h a t  t he  spacecraft  was ready fo r  f l i g h t .  
pointed out again t h a t  any abnormality, out-of-tolerance condition, mal- 
function, o r  f a i l u r e  r e su l t i ng  from any of these  t e s t s ,  was recorded, 
reported,  and evaluated t o  determine the  cause and the  e f f e c t  on mission 
performance. 
It should be 
11. FAILURE REPORTING, FAILURE ANALYSIS, AND 
CORRECTIVE ACTION 
Degradation i n  the  inherent  r e l i a b i l i t y  of the  spacecraf t  systems 
was minimized through t h e  r i g i d  qua l i t y  cont ro l  system and a closed- 
loop fai lure-report ing and correct ive-act ion system. 
fl ight-configured equipment, during and a f t e r  acceptance tes t s ,  were 
required t o  be reported and analyzed. 
a ly  was considered t o  be a random f a i l u r e .  
expended t o  determine the  cause of t he  anomaly t o  permit immediate cor- 
r ec t ive  action. 
A l l  f a i l u r e s  of 
No f a i l u r e ,  malfunction, o r  anom- 
A l l  possible  e f f o r t  was 
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Comprehensive fa i lure-ana lys i s  labora tor ies  were es tab l i shed  a t  t he  
Kennedy Space Center and a t  the  spacecraft  cont rac tor ' s  p l an t  t o  provide 
rapid response concerning f a i l u r e s  or malfunctions which occurred i m e d i -  
a t e l y  p r i o r  t o  spacecraf t  del ivery o r  launch. 
However, i n  cases where the  e lec t ronic  o r  electro-mechanical equip- 
ment was extremely complex, the f a i l e d  p a r t  usual ly  was returned t o  the  
vendor when the  f a i l u r e  analysis  required spec ia l  engineering knowledge, 
technica l  s k i l l s ,  and sophis t icated t e s t  equipment. 
A tabulated,  nar ra t ive  summary of a l l  f a i l u r e s  which occurred on the  
spacecraf t  and spacecraf t  equipment was kept current by the  prime con- 
t r a c t o r .  This l i s t  was continuously reviewed by the  customer and the  
contractor  t o  assure acceptable and t imely f a i l u r e  analyses and r e s u l t -  
ing cor rec t ive  act ion.  The contractor  es tabl ished a p r i o r i t y  system t o  
expedite those f a i l u r e  analyses which were most s ign i f i can t  t o  the 
pending missions. 
A simplif ied flow diagram of the correct ive ac t ion  system i s  shown 
i n  f igu re  7. 
A mate r i a l  review board determined the  d ispos i t ion  of t h e  f a i l e d  equip- 
ment, and an analysis  of t he  f a i l u r e  was conducted a t  e i t h e r  the  suppli-  
e r ' s  p l an t ,  t he  prime cont rac tor ' s  p l an t ,  or  a t  t he  Kennedy Space Center, 
depending on the  nature of t he  condition, t he  construction of t he  equip- 
ment, and the a v a i l a b i l i t y  of the f a c i l i t i e s  a t  each of t h e  respect ive 
loca t ions .  When the analysis  of a suppl ie r ' s  equipment was conducted 
All f a i l u r e s  or malfunctions were recorded and reported.  
22 
at the prime contractor's plant or at the Kennedy 
respective supplier's representative was expected 
analysis. 
Space Center, the 
to participate in the 
When the failure-analysis report was available, the recommended cor- 
rective action was evaluated, and a decision rendered to implement the 
required corrective action. 
board action to correct a design deficiency, a change in manufacturing 
processes, establishment of new quality control techniques, and/or 
changes to the acceptance-testing criteria. 
evaluated to determine whether qualification status of the equipment had 
been effected. If the equipment could not be considered to be qualified 
by similarity, additional environmental tests were conducted to confirm 
the qualification status. 
This may have required management change 
Each change was also 
12. UNMANNED FLIGHT TESTS 
The final tests conducted to support the manned missions were the 
unmanned flights of Gemini I and Gemini 11. 
structural integrity of the spacecraft and demonstrated compatibility 
with the launch vehicle. Gemini 11, a suborbital flight, consisted of 
a production spacecraft with all appropriate onboard systems operating 
during prelaunch, launch, reentry, postflight, and recovery. Each sys- 
tem was monitored by special telemetry and cameras that photographed the 
crew station instrument panels throughout the flight. 
demonstrated the capability of the heat-protection devices to withstand 
Gemini I verified the 
The flight 
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t h e  maximum heating r a t e  and temperature of reentry.  
p l e t ion  of the Gemini I1 mission, combined with ground qua l i f i ca t ion  
t e s t  resul ts ,  formed the b a s i s  f o r  declar ing the  spacecraf t  qua l i f ied  f o r  
manned space f l i g h t .  
The successful  can- 
Subsequent t o  Gemini XI1 del ivery,  t h e  f a i l u r e  h i s to ry  was reviewed 
t o  determine how adequate t h e  test  program had been i n  meeting i t s  objec- 
t i v e s .  
spacecraft-type equipment. 
cant t o  requi re  act ion by a Material Review Board, which w a s  composed 
of more than one engineering d isc ip l ine .  
primary equipment f a i l u r e s ,  1474 were induced f a i l u r e s ,  and 647 were 
f a i l u r e s  such t h a t  the cause could not  be determined. These malfunctions 
a re  shown i n  t a b l e  I V .  O f  the  7792 malfunction repor t s  analyzed, 2392 
were wr i t t en  on non-flight-configured equipment used f o r  qua l i f i ca t ion ,  
A t o t a l  of 7792 malfunction r epor t s  had been wr i t ten  on 
These repor t s  were su f f i c i en t ly  s i g n i f i -  
O f  t h i s  t o t a l ,  5671 were 
I 
1 r e l i a b i l i t y ,  l i f e ,  and engineering tes ts ,  and 5400 were wr i t t en  on 
f l ight-configured equipment. 
The predel ivery acceptance (FDA) and p r e i n s t a l l a t i o n  acceptance (PIA) 
t es t s  were designed t o  detect  equipment f a i l u r e s  a t  t he  e a r l i e s t  possible  
time i n  the  spacecraft  buildup sequence. 
malfunctions analyzed, 52 percent occurred i n  PDA t e s t i n g ;  another 
O f  the  t o t a l  flight-hardware 
36 percent occurred i n  PIA tes t ing .  
ware malfunctions occurred during the  conduct of these t e s t s  before the  
equipment was i n s t a l l e d  i n  t h e  spacecraf t .  
Thus, 88 percent of a l l  f l i g h t  hard- 
24 
This indicates t h a t  the  acceptance tests effectively accomplished 
the  purpose f o r  which they were designed. 
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